A week ago, Richard Perle got up and said:
Defined as a robust approach, I think it is fair to say that not only is the neoconservative moment not over, it is, sorry Josh, just beginning. What is also not over is the left’s obsession with neoconservatism, or what they believe neoconservatism is. An obsession that if you look at Mr. Marshall’s blog you will find preoccupies what I think must be almost every waking moment. [6:30]
The occasion was a debate at the Hudson Institute, a neocon think tank, with as topic “Is the neoconservative moment over?” What follows is two hours of essential and riveting viewing, available free and on demand at the C-Span website and worth checking out in a lull between food-induced stupors this Christmas holiday, because none other than neoconservatism’s prime operative lays out the most honest and articulate apologia I’ve heard for Bush’s post-9/11 policies. Joshua Marshall, the butt of barely concealed disdain by Perle, Mentioning “the execrable Robert Fisk,” Perle turns to Marshall and says “I suspect he’s a pal of yours.” plays the role of pi“ada in a roomful of neocons, but manages to make the obvious broadsides in return. It’s the ideological equivalent of an ambulance hitting a schoolbus, in slow motion, on video, and it left me agape at times.
In the audience sat Michelle Goldberg, of Salon, and she wrote up the event here. Marshall of course covers it in his blog here, here and here. It turns out Josh was on the tail end of a flu-ish bout, hence his inability, perhaps, to muster indignation at jibe after jibe. Or perhaps he just has bloggers’ thick skin. This triangulation of perspectives fills out our view of the event rather nicely, but there is still a bit more to squeeze from it:
First, the C-Span camera crew seems to have a policy that cut-aways from the debate protagonists must include long lingering closeups of all the pretty women in the room. And I must say that there were quite a few in attendance. Are they all neocons? I wonder how much of this neocon machismo is just another tactic to get chicks? To be fair, Marshall himself flirts via his blog with Salon’s GoldbergTo get a good, long, lingering look at Goldberg’s “downtown haircut and style of dress”, fast forward to 1:20:42 on your Real Player.. Is US foreign policy just the result of policy wonks trying to get laid? I thought West Wing was fiction.
Second, I think Perle may have been too honest:
Everything we did after September 11 might well have been done before September 11, with two obvious added benefits. We would have avoided September 11 and we could probably have destroyed much of the Al Qaeda network while it was comfortably ensconced behind the protection of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But we waited too long. This has led some of us, and I believe it helped lead President Bush to the conclusion that we mustn’t wait too long with respect to Iraq. [10:45]
Which is really a remarkable admission. Is he admitting that the decision to remove Saddam was taken soon after 9/11, subsequent facts be damned? Did missing the intelligence that could have prevented 9/11 really justify being paranoid subsequently with Iraq? Maddeningly, I don’t remember Marshall or anyone else pressing Perle on the practice of stovepiping, the triumph of ideology over accuracy that whipped the White House into a war frenzy and which is now a major source of contention.
Marshall does try to corner Perle on the fact that in the absence of WMDs, if you plan to justify pre-emptively invading Iraq on the lesser charge of Saddam failing to prove a lack of WMDs to your satisfaction, you need to demonstrate a reasonable chance of your policy being successful, because other policy options are available. Is erring on the side of caution really a good idea when the error involves the additional costs of alienating allies, sidelining the UN, trodding all over international law and widespread popular resentment, not to mention US lives and a lot of money?
To Perle, this line of argumentation is scorn-inducing, but to me, it made the game of Spot the Paranoid Ideologue far too easy: Perle cannot conceive that those who disagree with his beliefs are sincere. I, at least, am willing to believe Perle means what he says. If Perle thinks asking whether there could have been more productive ways to spend such scarce resources is tantamount to a self-hating attempt to sabotage the defense of the homeland, then I think Perle forfeited the intellectual debate. And I mean that.
After listening to Perle, I still find the attitude – not the goals – of the neocons counterproductive. I argued on memefirst in favor of war against Saddam, so I agree with Perle’s thesis that in light of 9/11 it became imperative to use American power against potential threats, even if that meant bypassing the UN.
Where we part is the neocon’s scorn of international institutions and cooperating with our allies. Perle says that in the post-Cold War environment, the natural divergence of perspectives and concerns betwee Washington and Paris, for instance, meant that it simply wasn’t worth pursuing European support; and that the French and Germans wouldn’t have added much anyway. This neglectful attitude was evident in America’s lackluster diplomacy between September 2002 and the outbreak of war in March 2003.
Why not have your cake and eat it? Marshall made the obvious points that the US could use international support in terms of troops and financial commitment. I could add that the UN has a lot more nation-building expertise than the Pentagon.
More broadly, the neocons don’t consider the intangible but real benefits of a benign hegemon in underpinning the global balance of power and flows of international capital and goods. America could lead the world because other countries consented to its power; they equated their interests with those of America’s.
Interests may naturally diverge, so I agree that the US has to walk a different path. Surely it is the role of diplomacy to try to smooth this process. But we have not pursued diplomacy, we have instead adopted a ‘take it or leave it’ policy that undermines allies’ sense that, by supporting international institutions, America’s goals coincide with their own. The alienation is heightened by the Bush’s policy of quashing any challenge of military power, testing micro-nukes, and most of all by our inexcusable betrayal of human rights at Guantanamo Bay.
I’m in favor of a muscular US foreign policy. Surely a real attempt can be made to explain it to all of our allies and try to bring them on board, and to realize that submitting to some constraints can bring benefits. The neocons don’t take time to analyse whether the trade-off is worth it; they dismiss the notion out of hand. Isn’t that dangerous?